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Abstract  11 
Systems biology faces a choice between reductionist and holist approaches, but 12 
practising systems biologists are often unaware of what the implications of each path 13 
will be.  Modern neo-holism, as manifested in Robert Rosen’s Relational Biology, 14 
concludes that the functions of complex systems are irreducible to the functions of 15 
their component parts, and also implies that the current foundations of computational 16 
theory are inadequate for systems biology.  By contrast, modern neo-reductionism 17 
replaces classical conceptions of inter-theory reduction with the looser concept of 18 
supervenience, in the process reassuring us that we can make progress in systems 19 
biology with computational theory as we know it today.  However, the price to pay for 20 
this is a shift away from modelling to realizational strategies.  Either way, the entire 21 
field of systems biology may have to change course if it is to accomplish its goals. 22 
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FROM BIOCHEMISTRY THROUGH MOLECULAR BIOLOGY TO SYSTEMS 23 
BIOLOGY  24 
 25 
One rainy spring morning in Glasgow in about 1984, I sat in a lecture theatre and heard 26 
my physiology professor tell the class that the problem with biochemists was that they 27 
just wanted to put everything in a bucket, blend it to a puree, and then talk about the 28 
properties of the resulting sludge.  The class laughed, of course, not realising that this 29 
was physiology’s oldest joke, possibly around 100 years old, and that our professor 30 
had been using it for almost as long.  About eight years later, by which time I had 31 
become a lab research assistant at the University of Warwick, I heard just one of these 32 
“bucket biochemists” complain, with somewhat less humorous intent, that it was 33 
virtually impossible by then to obtain a grant for doing biochemistry unless some gene-34 
centred molecular biology angle could be found on the project.  A quarter century 35 
later still, it is now the molecular biologists who are finding it difficult to obtain 36 
research funding for single-gene-focussed projects in an age of increasingly “big data” 37 
systems biology.  In any era, it seems as if a young scientist is unlikely to retire 38 
(assuming she survives in the profession to retirement) in the same field in which she 39 
began. 40 
 41 
Works on systems biology often begin by making some startling claims for its novelty 42 
or importance.  For instance, one of the commonest generalizations concerning 43 
systems biology is that, in the words of the welcome message to the 11th International 44 
Systems Biology Conference in Edinburgh in October 2010, it “takes a holistic view on 45 
biology and aims at elucidating design principles of whole biological systems rather 46 
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than of individual biomolecules or single events” (italics added).   Even more radically, 47 
it is sometimes stated that systems biology is a paradigm shift, nothing short of a 48 
fundamentally new way of doing biological sciences1. 49 
 50 
Certainly, systems biology makes use of a whole raft of new technologies that matured 51 
around the millennium and in the decade that followed.  Deep sequencing and other 52 
high throughput analysis tools spawned a gaggle of data cataloguing capabilities with 53 
names all ending in “omics”.  Genomics, metagenomics, transcriptomics, proteomics, 54 
lipidomics and metabolomics, to name just a few, produced data on a scale previously 55 
unimaginable in biology.  Crucially, this expansion of the traditional molecular biology 56 
laboratory into a data generating factory coincided with an explosion in the power and 57 
availability of computers.  Indeed, omics disciplines would scarcely be possible without 58 
some way of handling their often terabyte-sized outputs.  With the power to describe 59 
whole systems of biomolecules, whole cells, and even whole organisms, at molecular 60 
levels of detail, systems biology became an inevitability.   61 
 62 
“ORDER AND PROGRESS”: AUGUSTE COMTE’S POSITIVISM AND ITS 63 
LEGACY 64 
 65 
Any discipline so intent on wholes might facetiously be described as “wholist”, but 66 
does that necessarily imply a genuine holism?  Although the disruptive technologies 67 
of the omics revolution have transformed the practice of biology research, shedding 68 
the reductionist legacy of mid-to-late-20th century molecular biology has been 69 
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difficult2.  This is scarcely surprising once one considers exactly how deep its roots are, 70 
extending back to the positivism of the 19th century French visionary Auguste Comte 71 
(1798-1857), which by his death had even acquired rituals and a priesthood, the 72 
Religion de l’Humanité3.  This cult aspect of positivism was briefly quite successful, 73 
especially in Brazil, and its motto, “Order and Progress”, can still be found on the 74 
Brazilian flag.  Positivism also acquired political ambitions, in which the bizarre idea of 75 
European unity was stressed.  Comte’s proposed “Great Western Republic” would 76 
include France, the British Isles, Germany, the Low Countries, the Iberian peninsular 77 
and Italy and would have its capital, naturally, in Paris.  If that were not bad enough, 78 
Greece and Poland would also be invited to join in a second phase of “accessory 79 
members”4. 80 
 81 
Auguste Comte had a rather unhappy personal life, afflicted with mental illness, 82 
unrequited love and at least one unsuccessful suicide attempt.  In the words of one 83 
unsympathetic modern critic: “Comte was a strange individual.  Indeed it would not 84 
be stretching language to say he was mad”5, p.44.  Despite his prickly personality and 85 
long-winded prose, or perhaps even because of it, Comte possessed a remarkable 86 
ability to influence even those who disliked him personally or had philosophical 87 
reservations about the more over-arching aspects of his creed, and positivist ideas 88 
spread far beyond his narrow circle of devotees within the Religion de l’Humanité3.  89 
Even in the 21st century it is common to hear scientists, or even the general public, use 90 
positivist language, though the vast majority of them have never heard of Comte.  91 
 92 
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Comte saw all of human thought as classifiable into three modes:  Theological, 93 
Metaphysical and Positive, and divided up human history on that basis.  The thing that 94 
characterized science, setting it apart from the religion of the Theologians and the 95 
creative philosophizing of the Metaphysicians, was that it was based solely on 96 
tangible, demonstrable, common-sense evidence, in other words on what could be 97 
positively known – science was Positive.  However, different sciences were at different 98 
stages of the Metaphysical-Positive transition (Fig. 1), and this ordering was the basis 99 
for Comte’s “law of filiation of the sciences”: “Thus we have before us Five 100 
fundamental Sciences in successive dependence, – Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, 101 
Physiology, and finally Social Physics”6, p.28  (irregular capitalization and punctuation in 102 
original), and “every science is [rooted] in the one which precedes it”.  Each successive 103 
science had sprung forward from the previous member of the chain, with its transition 104 
into Positivity building on the established successes of its predecessor disciplines.  105 
Comte considered physics and chemistry as having achieved, by the mid-19th century, 106 
the full Positive stage of development, and biology as being nearly there.  Sociology 107 
was considered to be still wallowing in the Metaphysical morass, and Comte saw it as 108 
his own specific scientific task to bring it forward into the Positive phase. 109 
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110 
Figure 1: Comte’s Law of Filiation of the Sciences  111 
Legend: Each discipline passes progressively through Theological and Metaphysical 112 
phases (yellow) before entering the Positive phase (red), at which point it becomes a 113 
true science.  Comte was vague concerning the exact date of these transitions.  Only 114 
1842, the date of the completion of his major work, Cours de philosophie positive, is 115 
firmly given as the year in which “social physics” achieves the Positive phase.  The 116 
transitions are aided by input from the previous discipline in the filial chain. 117 
 118 
Comte’s eclectic system has often been portrayed by historians as a response to the 119 
chaos of the French Revolution and the reactionary regimes that followed it, 120 
attempting to restore order and progress, as its motto declared, to a ravaged and 121 
disillusioned France.  In the following century, this spirit was reawakened in the ruins 122 
of the equally devastated Hapsburg Empire in central Europe and, amid the 123 
cosmopolitan Kaffeehaus culture of Vienna, positivism became logical positivism. 124 
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 125 
THE VIENNA CIRCLE AND CLASSICAL REDUCTIONISM 126 
 127 
The Vienna Circle7 was formally instituted as the Ernst Mach Society on 23rd November 128 
1928.  It managed to clean up Comte’s positivism, stripping away the religious and 129 
political accretions and creating a version of refined purity, and if ever there was a 130 
philosophy suited to those of a purist inclination, it is the logical positivism of the 131 
Vienna Circle.  Moritz Schlick (1882-1936) and his Vienna Circle colleagues recast 132 
Comte’s concept of the unique value of that which could be positively known, as a 133 
means for creating a boundary criterion between the meaningful and the meaningless.  134 
In the new logical positivism, theological and metaphysical statements were not 135 
wrong, but merely senseless.  The most charitable thing that could be said for them 136 
was that they perhaps had some subjective artistic validity, comparable with the 137 
meaning to be found in music or literature.  The physicist Ernst Mach (1838-1916), 138 
after whom they took their official name, had pioneered an extreme form of this neo-139 
positivist attitude in his rejection of the reality of common physical concepts such as 140 
atoms, relegating them to the dustbin of metaphysical constructs8.  In the words of 141 
Vienna Circle member Philipp Frank (1884-1966): “physics is nothing but a collection 142 
of statements about the connections among sense perceptions, and theories are 143 
nothing but economical means of expression for summarizing these conditions”9, p.220. 144 
 145 
Physics, freed from all metaphysical trappings, was the natural foundation stone upon 146 
which the rest of science could be constructed.  The resulting hierarchy therefore 147 
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repeated Comte’s law of filiation, in essentially the same order but rotating Comte’s 148 
linear succession into a stacked structure (Fig. 2).  Chemistry, depending as it does on 149 
the atomic laws of the physicist, is the next level in the structure, sitting on top of 150 
physics.  This is followed by biology, or possibly biochemistry, then cell biology, 151 
physiology and finally things like psychology and the social sciences.  This layered 152 
model is so engrained into our current view of science that it is a little odd to imagine 153 
that it is barely 90 years old.  The logical positivists’ achievement was to begin with a 154 
difficult philosophical concept wrung from complex wrangling about meaning and 155 
evidence, and turn it into a framework for the explanation of one scientific discipline 156 
in terms of another: inter-theoretic reduction.    By means of the process of inter-157 
theoretic reduction “the whole of Science becomes Physics ... every scientific 158 
statement can be interpreted, in principle, as a physical statement”10, pp.98-99 (capitals 159 
and italics in original), or as Thomas Nagel has expressed it more recently: 160 
“Reductionism is the idea … that physics is the theory of everything”11, p.3.  Scientific 161 
disciplines are mere flags of convenience within a single physics-based Unified 162 
Science8. 163 
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 164 
Figure 2: The layered mode of the reductionist hierarchy.  165 
Legend: Statements in each discipline are re-expressible in terms of, or reducible to, 166 
statements in the discipline immediately below it.  167 
 168 
The Vienna Circle never quite achieved its aims in full.  Its leader, Moritz Schlick, was 169 
murdered by a student in 1936 and the Anschluss of Austria in 1938 sent many of its 170 
main members into exile.  However, just in time, the ideas of the Vienna Circle had 171 
entered the English-speaking world through the publication of A.J. Ayer’s (1910-1989) 172 
Language, Truth and Logic in 1936, probably the nearest thing to a bestseller that 173 
philosophy has ever seen12.  It is therefore unsurprising that in molecular biology, 174 
Francis Crick’s (1916-2004) reductionism seems to be sung straight from the logical 175 
positivist hymn sheet: “The ultimate aim of the modern movement in biology is in fact 176 
to explain all biology in terms of physics and chemistry” (italics in original)13, p.10. 177 
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 178 
Reductionism has achieved possibly its most extreme form in singularitarianism.  179 
Originating in the work of Raymond Kurzweil14 and having some affinities with Frank 180 
Tipler’s “omega point”15,16, the singularity is a future date at which Moore’s Law17 on 181 
the exponential growth of processing power has produced computers of such power 182 
that everything can be computed and we will therefore know everything.  Kurzweil 183 
believes this point will be reached as soon as 2045.  Even sooner than that, he claims, 184 
computers will be capable of modelling our own cognitive functions, and therefore 185 
consciousness, so accurately that we could upload copies of ourselves in silico and live 186 
immortally in cyberspace.  An exact copy of our brain structure, down to the atomic 187 
level of every neuron would, the singularitarians believe, exhibit the same thoughts as 188 
the real thing, the same emotions, tastes and memories.  Its bodily substance would 189 
be metal, plastic and silicon chips rather than proteins, lipids and carbohydrates, but 190 
those copies would nevertheless be us and our disembodied selves would feel our 191 
existence as being in the machine – or perhaps spread over several machines in a 192 
computing cloud. 193 
 194 
Kurzweil’s thesis has enormous emotional appeal, promising that all the world’s 195 
problems will be solved, even our own individual mortalities indefinitely postponed, 196 
as long as the inexorable march of Moore’s Law continues.  But it also requires that 197 
reductionism be correct.  All biology has to be physics, and all problems have to be 198 
computational problems, for the singularitarian vision to be achievable.  The world 199 
must be merely a sum of atoms, and our understanding of the world no more than a 200 
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sum of bytes and bits, or else it will fail.  Even if this were true, however, there is 201 
another problem with the singularitarian project. 202 
 203 
Even relatively trivial brute force calculations on computers can require exponentially 204 
increasing processing times.  Bremerman’s Limit18, the theoretical absolute maximum 205 
processing speed, at which every atom of the computer is vapourised as its mass is 206 
entirely converted into energy, is insufficient to generate answers to some basic 207 
combinatorial problems19.  Reductionism, and especially its extreme singularitarian 208 
variant, breaks down on its epistemology.  Even assuming we can solve every scientific 209 
problem just by computing it, we would need to wait forever to do so. 210 
 211 
FROM CLASSICAL HOLISM TO NEO-HOLISM 212 
 213 
Around the time that the Ernst Mach Society was organizing its first formal meetings 214 
in Vienna, Jan Smuts (1870-1950) was taking a break after his first stint as South 215 
African Prime Minister, to write Holism and Evolution20, coining the word holism from 216 
the Greek őλος (a whole).  Like Comte, Smuts had great ambitions for his philosophy: 217 
“All the problems of the universe, not only those of matter and life, but also and 218 
especially those of mind and personality, which determine human nature and destiny, 219 
can in the last resort only be resolved – in so far as they are humanly soluble – by 220 
reference to the fundamental concept of Holism”.  For Smuts, the vera causa, an 221 
innate tendency for stable wholes to form from parts, occurring at all levels from the 222 
atomic through the biological to the psychological, steered the entire universe.  The 223 
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original conception of holism was more metaphysical than scientific, and Smuts did 224 
not acquire the same cult following as Comte had done a century previously.  225 
Nevertheless, the term holism moved into the world of science and began to be used 226 
more generally by opponents of reductionism. 227 
 228 
One of the most intriguing critiques of reductionism in biology was supplied by Walter 229 
Elsasser (1904-1991), a quantum and geophysicist who, while working in Paris in the 230 
1930s, had been inspired to think about biology by the physiologist Théophile Kahn 231 
(1896-1986).  Elsasser was by no means the only holist biologist of the post-war era - 232 
the names of Paul Weiss (1898-1989) and Conrad Waddington (1905-1975) are often 233 
mentioned in this context21,22  – but Elsasser’s holistic vision was more fundamental 234 
than any of his contemporaries.  Elsasser’s biology came to be characterized by a 235 
wholesale rejection of the reductionist model of the Vienna Circle as implemented in 236 
molecular biology.  What makes Elsasser’s holism a neo-holism rather than a successor 237 
to that of Smuts, was that he insisted that it be based on the most fundamental of 238 
physical theories, quantum mechanics, and that he rather curiously still described 239 
himself as a positivist23, p.33. 240 
 241 
Elsasser only began to publish in biology in the late 1950s, by which time he had 242 
decamped to the USA, after some two decades of digesting Theophile Kahn’s ideas.  243 
Elaboration of his critique of reductionism was to occupy him for most of the 1960s 244 
and into the early 1970s.  Elsasser does not merely attack the mainstream biological 245 
reductionism of the kind popularised by Francis Crick but, rather more radically, 246 
attacks the whole notion of molecular determinism in biology, using a difficult 247 
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argument he named the Principle of Finite Classes.  Elaboration of this argument would 248 
require a chapter in its own right, and has been done elsewhere24, but in essence it 249 
argues that wave function collapse, the phenomenon that produces the deterministic 250 
world of observable phenomena from the indeterminate world of quantum 251 
mechanics, only applies to simple molecules, such as those studied in the physics and 252 
chemistry laboratory.  The complex molecules of biology – things like proteins, 253 
carbohydrates, lipids and nucleic acids – do not achieve wave function collapse, and 254 
therefore are always liable to behave in an indeterminate manner25, p.169. 26, p.286.  For 255 
Elsasser, much of biology was in fact “acausal”27.  Figure 3 summarises the argument 256 
in graphical form. 257 
 258 
Figure 3:  Elsasser’s Principle of Finite Classes argument.   259 
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Legend: In a simple physical system - an infinite class - there are sufficiently few 260 
quantum states (small arrows) that they can be averaged (large arrow).  In a complex 261 
biological system - a finite class - there are so many that no average may be obtained 262 
(4-headed “arrow”).  There is therefore no causal connection between the microscopic 263 
and macroscopic worlds for biological objects. 264 
 265 
Elsasser’s argument against determinism in biology stimulated some inconclusive 266 
critiques in the 1960s, and then faded into obscurity, having been neither conclusively 267 
disproved nor having found many adherents.  It was, perhaps, a casualty of its own 268 
difficulty – few can feel equally comfortable in both the fields of quantum mechanics 269 
and biology – and Elsasser’s own apparent reluctance to engage directly with his 270 
critics.  Indeed, by 1969, when Elsasser declared that he was “therefore addressing 271 
the present scheme mainly to younger people whose philosophy may not yet have 272 
approached a point of condensation”27,p.503, one can almost hear the electric guitars 273 
wailing in the background. 274 
 275 
Nevertheless, despite Elsasser’s inability, or reluctance, to force his theory into the 276 
mainstream, his influence on modern neo-holism remains profound, because even if 277 
his anti-deterministic argument was flawed, it produced, as a by-product, an 278 
alternative to the layered model of Vienna Circle reductionism.  For Elsasser, biology 279 
was the science of the complex, and therefore is a superset of all the other sciences 280 
which deal with subject matter of greater regularity than the messy stuff of biology.  281 
Chemistry and physics are subsets of “biology” (as Elsasser conceived it), activities that 282 
commence when we start to refine our area of study down to the molecular and 283 
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Figure 4: Walter Elsasser’s alternative to the layered model (see Figure 2).   288 
Legend: Rather than biology emerging from chemistry or physics, the latter are sub-289 
fields of a new science of complex systems.  Physics and chemistry are not more 290 
fundamental than biology, but are actually rather specialist areas of biology which 291 
deal with infinite classes, i.e. with simple, homogeneous subject matter.  See also Fig. 292 
3. 293 
[M,R] – THE IRREDUCIBLE PARADIGM OF RELATIONAL BIOLOGY 294 
 295 
Elsasser’s influence channels into modern holism through Robert Rosen (1934-1998), 296 
whose mathematical work, which he collectively termed relational biology, has 297 
achieved the status of a Mrs Rochester in systems biology’s attic.  The centrepiece of 298 
Rosen’s critique of reductionism is the [M,R] system – standing for 299 
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Metabolism/Repair. [M,R] is a small self-referential network of four components, 300 
three of which act functionally within the network (Fig. 5).  It may be interpreted as a 301 
biochemical pathway with four moieties and three steps, in which the each of the final 302 
three moieties are also catalysts for a unique step.  This toy system was the subject of 303 
a mathematical demonstration that it was not possible to predict the properties of its 304 
entirety through an analysis of the properties of its individual components28,29.  [M,R] 305 
is therefore not reducible to its component parts and can only be understood as a 306 
whole.  Rosen took pains to give [M,R] as few parts and functions as possible – it is the 307 
self-referential nature of its structure, the way that three of the four components are 308 
necessary for the production of three other components of the same set of four, that 309 
causes the breakdown in the reductionist hierarchy.  Irreducible complexity does not 310 
require a big and complicated system, but can be present in tiny toy systems like [M,R].  311 
Indeed, Rosen defines complex system as those which cannot be reduced. 312 
 313 
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 314 
Figure 5:  Rosen’s allegedly irreducible M-R system   315 
Legend: Full arrows – the M reactions - are chemical transformations: A is converted 316 
to B, B to f and f to Φ.  Red dotted arrows are the R catalytic steps: f’, the catalytic form 317 
of f, catalyses the production of B from A, b, the catalytic form of B, catalyses the 318 
production of Φ from f and so on.  319 
 320 
With Rosen, we are no longer in the business of the epistemological anti-reductionism 321 
which defeats the singularitarian argument.  Rosen’s antireductionism was 322 
explanatory.  Irreducibility is a property independent of the size of the thing that 323 
cannot be reduced.  [M,R], he claims, simply cannot be explained using a reductionist 324 
approach.  Epistemological anti-reductionism is a holism in practice, an observation 325 
that certain components of the reductionist programme are infeasible.  Explanatory 326 
anti-reductionism is a holism in principle.  327 
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 328 
Rosen draws comparisons with Elsasser’s nested model – as a complex system [M,R] 329 
as a whole is situated in the domain of “biology” or the science of complexity whatever 330 
name one gives to it.  Break [M,R] down into its component individual steps and these 331 
are then in the domains of “physics” or “chemistry”.  However, what we can say 332 
mathematically about the behaviour of the component parts, cannot be subjected to 333 
any additive process that will allow us a complete mathematical description of the 334 
whole.  Thus what we can say in the molecular biology laboratory about single proteins 335 
or genes does not tell us, contra Crick, all that we would wish to know about the whole 336 
organism from which they are isolated, even if we have full knowledge of all of the 337 
components and how they function in isolation.  338 
 339 
Rosen also ventured that [M,R] could have a more general interpretation.  As well as 340 
representing a single self-referential network, the component parts could be taken to 341 
represent sets of reactions in living things.  For instance, the first step could represent 342 
not just one, but all, metabolic reactions, the second and third steps sets of other 343 
reactions necessary to ensure that metabolism can continue – hence the 344 
Metabolism/Repair name.  Pursuing this set-oriented interpretation of [M,R], Aloisius 345 
Louie has described its components in terms of formal set algebra30.  Louie’s central 346 
result from this analysis is the identification the presence of an impredicative set 347 
within [M,R], meaning a set that is member of itself.  Impredicative sets are non-348 
computable on a Turing machine, which remains the basic conceptual architecture of 349 
all computers.  By implication, no complex system and no biological system can 350 
therefore be fully functionally modelled in silico. 351 
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 352 
Biology, if Rosen and Louie are correct, is therefore not only non-reducible in the 353 
laboratory but also cannot be modelled on a computer. The seriousness of this 354 
conclusion for systems biology as it is currently practiced, has generated a stunned 355 
silence punctuated by occasional attempts at refutation.  However, the various 356 
attempted disproofs31,32 of Louie and Rosen’s work have also proved technically 357 
controversial, and the resulting lack of clarity has not served the debate well33.  358 
Rosen’s relational biology has achieved a higher profile than Elsasser’s work, insofar 359 
as systems biologists are often aware of its existence34,35, but its technical difficulty for 360 
those without the required background has left the adjudication on its validity to a 361 
small number of jurors who cannot reach a unanimous verdict. 362 
 363 
NEO-REDUCTIONISM: SOFTWARE LAWS, PHYSICS AND STAMP-364 
COLLECTING 365 
 366 
Anyone who has been an undergraduate in genetics or molecular biology since the 367 
1970s will be familiar with the workhorse examination question, “What is a gene?”  368 
Generations of students are thereby invited to do a little inter-theoretic reduction in 369 
the spirit of the Vienna Circle, expressing the higher-level abstract explanations of 370 
genetics in terms of the nuts and bolts of molecular biology.  Prior to its arrival in the 371 
examinations hall, this topic had formed the basis of Kenneth Schaffner and David 372 
Hull’s (1935-2010) attempts, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, to apply Vienna Circle 373 
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reductionism to biology36,37.  It soon became obvious to them that this was not going 374 
to be easy. 375 
 376 
There is, for instance, no term in molecular biology that can capture everything that is 377 
implied by the term gene in classical genetics.  Molecular biologists know that genes 378 
are made of DNA, but each gene is unique in terms of how that DNA is constituted into 379 
that particular gene.  To reduce processes, such as segregation or gene silencing, the 380 
difficulties are even greater.  For the process of meiosis - the independent assortment 381 
of genes during gamete formation – the abstract genetic explanation is both far easier 382 
and far more illuminating than any attempt to be more specific about molecules.  383 
Indeed, meiosis can be represented simply in terms of a set of rules for moving objects.  384 
Even if those objects are not actual chromosomes but simulations, e.g. beanbags or 385 
graphic objects in a computer simulation, the same rules would apply, and that DNA-386 
free explanation would be a fully adequate one38.  Even if there were no actual 387 
biological objects, the theory would still make logical sense. 388 
 389 
In a systems biology context, one might derive novel rules concerning a set of 390 
properties of a gene-regulatory or metabolic network.  These rules might turn out to 391 
have logical validity in other contexts and different kinds of network, perhaps even in 392 
non-biological networks.  Of course in the real biological world, Mendelian and 393 
Darwinian and metabolic systems phenomena are instantiated in DNA, cells and 394 
organisms, but the laws we use to describe their behaviour are often independent of 395 
their substrate, what Paul Davies has called software laws rather than hardware 396 
laws39.  Reductionism does not so much fail here as appear to be an unnecessary 397 
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complication.  Schaffner therefore replaced classic inter-theoretic reduction with a 398 
more pragmatic biological principle of reduction36, a commitment to try to reduce 399 
wherever possible, to create as many reductive explanations as possible, even in the 400 
absence of complete reduction. 401 
 402 
Although this softened Crick’s vision of explaining all of biology in terms of physics and 403 
chemistry, it still placed biology within the layered model of the Vienna Circle.  The 404 
next stage in the evolution of reductionism, taken by Alexander Rosenberg, was to 405 
replace that model40,41.  Rosenberg proposes in its place a two-layer model (Fig. 6) 406 
building on the work42 of J.J.C. Smart (1920-2012).  The lower layer is physics and the 407 
upper layer is termed “engineering”.  This is not to be interpreted literally, but to serve 408 
as a shorthand for all sciences other than physics.  An “engineering” question is one 409 
that does not require an answer that includes a full physical explanation, but one for 410 
which chemistry, biology, psychology etc., will suffice.  Ernest Rutherford (1871-1937) 411 
previously made a similar analogy, but replaced “engineering” with “stamp 412 
collecting”. 413 
 414 
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 415 
Figure 6: Neo-reductionism’s simplification of the layered model 416 
Legend: Neo-reductionism’s flat model, an alternative hierarchy to Fig. 1, proposed by 417 
J.J.C. Smart but previously implied by Ernest Rutherford: “either physics or stamp 418 
collecting”. 419 
 420 
Neo-reductionism proposes that physics provides the description of the molecular 421 
order of a system – its micro-state - whereas “engineering” explanations refer to 422 
supra-molecular configurations of that system – its macro-state.  All macro-states are 423 
supervenient on underlying micro-states.  Supervenience implies that a given micro-424 
state will always result in the same macro-state.  By contrast, a macro-state may have 425 
more than one micro-state that will give rise to it (Fig. 7).  Micro-states therefore 426 
determine macro-states, but macro-states are not reducible to micro-states, or at 427 
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least not reducible to unique micro-states.  Davies’ software laws are therefore laws 428 
of the macro-state and not reducible to those of the micro-state.  The software laws, 429 
however, cannot allow behaviour which breaks the laws of the micro-state. 430 
 431 
 432 
Figure 7: The non-unique dependence of macrostates on microstates 433 
Legend: Classical reductionism has always struggled to determine how macrospace 434 
configurations are determined by their underlying microspaces, in other words how to 435 
model a macrospace.  Neo-reductionism implies that it is more important to 436 
understand how microspace variation affects that of macrospace, in other words how 437 
macrospace is realized. 438 
 439 
Moving outwards beyond individual systems, neo-reductionism sees the universe as 440 
consisting of a micro-space, its objective atomic/quantum physical reality, and a 441 
macro-space, which is the configuration of larger order entities studied by all the other 442 
sciences, and which is supervenient on the micro-space.  Interestingly, Elsasser had 443 
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already outlined a similar concept as part of his anti-reductionist argument.  His 444 
concept of variostability refers to the tendency of a macro-state of a system to remain 445 
coherent in the presence of micro-state variation43.  Although Elsasser argued that this 446 
had not merely anti-reductionist but even anti-determinist implications, his 447 
conclusions are dependent on the assumption that reductionism requires a unique 448 
micro-state to macro-state binary mapping.  Neo-reductionism of the kind advanced 449 
by Rosenberg, however, allows for a one-to-many mapping between macro-state and 450 
micro-states.  This is compatible with variostability. 451 
 452 
Another parallel with the work of Elsasser is his concept of biotonic laws, which he 453 
hypothesized as laws pertaining solely to biological systems, which were not reducible 454 
to underlying physical laws23.  Davies’ software laws concept can be made to fit 455 
partially with the biotonic laws concept, just as variostability can be made partially 456 
congruent with supervenience.  Neo-holism and neo-reductionism thus begin to find 457 
common ground.  Lest we become too enthused over the prospects of synthesis, 458 
however, it should be borne in mind that Elsasser drew his conclusions from his 459 
controversial quantum mechanical theory of the Principle of Finite Classes, which 460 
implied total indeterminacy for biological systems with respect to their physical 461 
constitution.  Neo-reductionism’s concept of supervenience requires a causal relation 462 
pointing upwards from micro-state to macro-state and therefore is deterministic in a 463 
way that Elsasser would have rejected. 464 
 465 
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MODELLING VERSUS REALIZATION 466 
 467 
Inter-theoretic reduction requires explanations of how one theory can be expressed 468 
in terms of a lower level theory in the layered hierarchy.  So the macro-space 469 
configurations of one discipline must be shown to be determined by the underlying 470 
micro-spaces of the theory below.  In other words, reductionism requires us to be able 471 
to model macro-spaces in terms of a micro-space.  Robert Rosen had stern words for 472 
reductionists on the subject of modelling, making a distinction between a true model 473 
and a mere simulation.  Imagine an attempt to build a piece of software to represent 474 
a biochemical network.  No matter how accurate the representation of the entities of 475 
the system may be, they are only in a model sensu strictu if the rules that connect 476 
them and govern their behaviour are also accurate representations of the laws of the 477 
natural world.  Otherwise the software is a simulation.  The entailment structure – the 478 
framework of rules that govern how bits of the system interact - of a true model 479 
faithfully represents the corresponding entailments of the thing being modelled28.  480 
Failure to do so will generate a black box, a simulation which may be very good at 481 
predicting the output given a set of inputs, but which does not represent any true 482 
understanding of the system.  Simulations are merely ad hoc black box predictors of 483 
the phenomenological behaviour of whatever they simulate. 484 
 485 
This is indeed a tough requirement to satisfy in any field.  Simulation, rather than 486 
modelling in Rosen’s sense, is the norm in most cases.  Rosen might be implying that 487 
when reductionists often think they have achieved inter-theoretic reduction, the 488 
reality may be considerably less conclusive.  However, Schaffner’s biological principle 489 
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of reduction acknowledges that this is often the case, at least in biology if not other 490 
disciplines, and accurate, if black box, simulation may be a good preparation for the 491 
deduction of a true model of the actual entailment structures of the system 492 
concerned. 493 
 494 
Even assuming that both aspects of an inter-theoretic reduction were completed to 495 
Rosen’s satisfaction, with adequate re-expression of both entities and entailment 496 
structures, the completed model of reduction is still vulnerable to change in either, or 497 
both, of the reduced and reducing theories.  If some aspect of biology is regarded as 498 
reduced to physics or at least chemistry, the assumption is made that the underlying 499 
chemistry is correct.  Should the relevant parts of chemistry be disproved, the 500 
reductional chain will be broken, and the biology will require to be re-reduced to the 501 
new physics or chemistry.  Previous satisfactory reductions may suddenly become 502 
invalid in this way, and reduction must always therefore be considered to be 503 
provisional.  However, just as a previous reductive chain may be broken by changes in 504 
the underlying theory, so may reduction become possible where before it was not44,45.  505 
Anti-reductionist declarations must always be provisional too.  Ernest Nagel (1901-506 
1985) points out46 that chemistry is only reducible to post-1925 physics, and 507 
thermodynamics is only reducible to post-1866 statistical mechanics.  In both cases it 508 
was advances in the lower theory (physics) that enabled the reduction, not any new 509 
insight into chemistry or any improvement in reductionist method.  The emerging 510 
consensus from the mid-1920s onwards that chemistry was finally reducible to 511 
physics, was one of the factors that spurred the enthusiasm of the Vienna Circle to 512 
apply reductionism everywhere. 513 
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 514 
Neo-reductionism avoids Rosen’s strictures regarding modelling and simulation, not 515 
by merely adopting the biological principle of reduction and/or conceding that 516 
reductions can remain provisional, but by replacing modelling with realization.  Neo-517 
reductionism’s concept of a non-unique macro-space to micro-space supervenience 518 
relationship implies that it is more important to understand how micro-space variation 519 
affects that of macro-space than to model the macro-space on the micro-space.  In 520 
other words, the question becomes how a macro-space is realized upwards from its 521 
underlying micro-space, rather than how to reduce/model downwards from macro-522 
space to micro-space. 523 
 524 
This notion has some considerable implications for scientific method.  The inversion 525 
required by neo-reductionism would seem to require a kind of Gestalt-switch in the 526 
way that our brains do science.  A plan for what science would look like once we have 527 
managed to perform that change in perspective, is not obvious.  Nevertheless, some 528 
intriguing hints are visible in the work of Stephen Wolfram on cellular automata.  An 529 
automaton is a software entity that performs certain behaviours under a simple set of 530 
rules47.  These may be very clear and straightforward – cellular automata have none 531 
of the knotted puzzle nature of [M,R].  However, they may exhibit remarkably rich 532 
patterns of activity.  Conway’s Game of Life is the most famous example of a cellular 533 
automaton, where different starting configurations result in radically different shifting 534 
outcomes.  Crucially, we know that cellular automata are deterministic – we 535 
programmers have specified their rules and they always abide by them.  We can 536 
therefore say that we fully understand the micro-space of the automaton.  Wolfram 537 
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produces a vast variety of such automata showing how complexity can arise from 538 
simple starting conditions and conversely how order can emerge from chaotic 539 
conditions.  According to Wolfram, there are many instances of automaton-like 540 
behaviour across a wide range of systems from physics to psychology.  Modelling a 541 
system is therefore less important than the question of whether the system behaves 542 
similarly to a known automaton, i.e. realization. 543 
 544 
For neo-reductionism, systems biology is labouring under the weight of the modelling 545 
problem, whereas it ought to be recasting itself in terms of the realization problem.  546 
The modelling problem founders both on the sheer scale of the data – it cannot 547 
counter epistemological anti-reductionist arguments - and also potentially on the 548 
hidden problems of self-referential systems – if Rosen is correct, it cannot counter 549 
explanatory anti-reductionist arguments either.    Even leaving Rosen aside, it is 550 
evident that the modelling problem is the problem of data increasing faster than the 551 
conclusions we can draw from it – a problem of where to end.  The realization 552 
problem, by contrast, is one of where to start. 553 
 554 
THE SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE 555 
 556 
The reductionism-holism debate in systems biology sits within a wider context that 557 
goes beyond the bounds of daily activity in the research lab.  This anthology is on the 558 
subject of the public understanding of biology.  The public understanding of science in 559 
general has become a speciality in its own right with endowed chairs in prestigious 560 
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universities and “public engagement” high on the priority list of league table-driven 561 
British universities.  However, this phrase implies that a failure to understand science 562 
is largely something “out there” in the public.  If only scientists can learn to 563 
communicate better, the public will understand better. 564 
 565 
Valuable as such evangelical work is – and after all, it is the public who are paying the 566 
major portion of the salaries of the scientists, so they are entitled to know where their 567 
money is going – it misses a problem rather closer to home: scientists often do not 568 
have a very firm conception of their own working methodology, and even less of a 569 
comprehension of the methodology of other scientific disciplines.  If anybody is 570 
looking for another chair to endow, a Professorship in the Scientific Understanding of 571 
Science would be both a provocative and valuable contribution. 572 
 573 
The origins of this problem lie in the fact that most undergraduate science courses do 574 
not teach the philosophy of science.  If they do, all that will be included will be an 575 
exhortation to perform experiments with careful controls that test hypotheses and 576 
seek to falsify rather than confirm them – in other words, most biologists, if they think 577 
about scientific method at all, are Popperians48.  Part of this is due to the advocacy of 578 
Karl Popper’s (1902-1994) legacy by Richard Dawkins and his predecessor as the UK’s 579 
favourite popular writer on biology, Peter Medawar (1915-1987), whose best-selling 580 
Advice to a Young Scientist laid down the Popperian law to many aspiring young 581 
molecular biologists of the 1980s and beyond49.   582 
 583 
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However, two things are rarely if ever mentioned when Popper is discussed by 584 
biologists: his anti-reductionism, which became stronger in his later years50, and the 585 
apparent anti-Darwinism of his late period (although his exact stance on this is still a 586 
matter of controversy).  Biologists in the 21st century thus usually hold an incompatible 587 
mixture of philosophical views on their own subject – a classical reductionism 588 
channelled from the Vienna Circle via A.J. Ayer to Francis Crick, rubbing shoulders with 589 
the post-Vienna Circle thought of Popper.  Often these are held at such an unconscious 590 
level that biologists will deny having any philosophical thoughts at all, believing all 591 
such things to be irrelevant to science. 592 
 593 
Scientists are therefore in a poor position to defend their discipline against those who 594 
would cast doubt on its entire existence.  To take a few common examples, 595 
sociologists of the “science studies” or “science, technology and society (STS)” 596 
persuasions seek to represent science as a set of rituals performed by a secular 597 
priesthood.  Neo-Marxists see it as a bourgeois activity devoted to replicating the 598 
existing political structure, and have a particular antipathy to biology as an obstacle to 599 
their notions of the infinite malleability of the human social order.   Social 600 
constructionists wish to deny any discipline that believes an objective view of reality 601 
can be achieved.  These are caricatures, of course, necessitated by brevity, but these 602 
threats to science in its current form are real.  In order to defend ourselves, scientists 603 
need a clearer idea of who we are, what we are doing and why, that goes deeper than 604 
the currently fashionable notions of “impact” and “engagement”.  Part of the 605 
formation of that clearer idea must come from a deeper understanding of our 606 
philosophical underpinnings.  Systems biology has an opportunity to lead the way in 607 
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this endeavour, given that the field sits on the cusp of a profound philosophical 608 
decision about its future orientation.  Systems biology may make scientists become 609 
natural philosophers once more. 610 
 611 
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